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Auth CS. USAF  
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22 December 1950

**MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

(Attn: Dr. William L. Langer, Asst. Director for  
National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency)

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**SUBJECT:** (Secret) Dissent of the D/I, U.S.A.F. on NIE-12,  
"Consequences of the Early Employment of Chinese  
Nationalist Forces in Korea," 21 December 1950

1. The Director of Intelligence, U.S.A.F., dissents in NIE-12.

2. In general, this estimate has emphasized the military and political disadvantages of the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea, and has failed to point out adequately the advantages which would accrue to the U.S.-U.N. campaign in Korea by the use of such forces. Specific points are as follows:

a. The discussions in this paper appear to have been governed by the acceptance of approximately 33,000 Nationalist troops as being essentially the total number available for employment in Korea. This office estimates this number to be far less than the total available.

b. The estimate does not give sufficient consideration to the fact that Chinese Nationalist Forces offer the only readily available force for major augmentation of U.N. forces in Korea. In fact, such insufficient consideration fails to give planners grounds for looking upon the availability of these forces as a factor influencing the determination as to whether or not a beachhead should be held at all.

c. Introduction of a large number of Chinese Nationalist troops could make a substantial contribution by providing much-needed infantry to the U.S.-U.N. campaign in Korea, if a beachhead were retained.

d. This office does not believe that the reactions of all the various Asiatic nations to the employment of Nationalist troops in Korea can be assessed with sufficient accuracy to warrant the conclusion that these Asiatic nations will be irrevocably opposed to the utilization of these anti-communist forces. In this respect, more deference is paid in this paper to the attitudes of the governments, or majorities in the respective countries, than to the elements which fully recognize the Communist menace and would be encouraged by this new opposition to Communism's advance. It is not beyond the bounds

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of possibility that even in Europe, public opinion might learn to applaud firm opposition, whether it be in Europe or in Asia, and in fact might prefer the fight to be made in Asia.

c. The estimate indicates that the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would eliminate any remaining chance of an immediate political solution of the Korean conflict. This dissent in no way is intended to contradict this conclusion. However, it appears to this office that the law of diminishing returns has set in with respect to the probability of a satisfactory immediate political solution. The discussion in the paper does not warrant a sound conclusion as to whether or not utilization of Nationalist troops would prejudice or aid an eventual political solution.

3. The estimate implies that the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would give impetus to, or provide the pretext for, increased militancy on the part of Communist China. It is reasonable that any increase in militancy, if such is possible (other than against Hong Kong), would be governed more by Chinese military capabilities and their own time-table than by any provocation which might result from the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea.

4. There appears to be insufficient data to justify the conclusion in paragraph 7 of this estimate that "the USSR would probably welcome a unilateral U.S. decision to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea."

5. This office would revise NIE-12 as indicated below:

a. Reference p. 2, par. 2. Revise as follows: "There is no immediate crisis in Korea requiring Chinese Nationalist troops to prevent a disaster, but this opportunity to begin the dynamic exploitation of any anti-Communist forces whose commitment could have a favorable effect on the Korean and possibly the entire Far Eastern situation should be given careful consideration. The Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa provide the only visible means for such exploitation. The presence or absence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea in the limited numbers estimated to be available within the immediate near future and later would not be an important a-major factor affecting the ability of UN forces to establish and hold a defensive line across the peninsula

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against numerically vastly superior Chinese Communist forces, unless the US-UN introduced reinforcements directly."

b. Reference p. 2, par. 3. Add at end of paragraph as follows: "An important requirement in Korea is for additional infantry. By using Nationalist infantry as a screening force, present UN forces in Korea could be used more effectively as a striking force. The defense of a beachhead requires a mobile reserve which can counterattack quickly at the points of greatest enemy pressure."

c. Reference par. 4. Amend first sentence and add a new sentence as follows: "Whatever the military outcome in Korea, the employment of Chinese Nationalists there would, in the eyes of certain other nations at the present time, further identify the US with the Chinese Nationalists and would constitute a degree of moral commitment for continuing US support of the Chinese Nationalist regime. At the same time this act would identify U.S. intentions to utilize anti-Communist forces within its capabilities, and as such might have a positive psychological effect of potentially great value upon anti-Communist forces."

d. Reference par. 5. Revise as follows: At the present time a majority of UN nations would probably reject a US proposal to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. There is a general apprehension that the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would give impetus, or at least provide the pretext, for increased militancy on the part of Communist China. Despite the repeated assurance of the US-UN to respect the Manchurian borders and the maintenance of the embargo against Chinese Nationalist operations on the mainland, Chinese Communist militancy has already reached a high level in committing the Fourth Field Army, which

represents the best available Chinese Communist military force. It is difficult to see any new form which this militancy could take (other than in Hong Kong). This-militancy-would-increase Therefore, there probably would be little increase in the danger of a general war with Communist China, which danger in-turn-might-develop-into-a-global-war already exists. This, too, <sup>probably</sup> will have little direct effect upon the development of a global war. At least in the beginning, the Western European nations would ~~might~~ feel strongly that the US was jeopardizing the first-priority task of defense of the European continent by ~~becoming-involved~~ a continued involvement in protracted hostilities in Asia. Later however, they might come to appreciate the determination of the US to take constructive action in an area of vital importance in the struggle against Soviet directed Communist aggression. The employment of the Chinese Nationalists would ~~might~~ alienate those element in certain other Asiatic countries, which who consider the Chinese Nationalists to be reactionary, politically incompetent, and already repudiated by their own people. On the other hand, the employment of the Chinese anti-Communist forces could hearten the anti-Communist ~~elements~~ elements of all Asiatic countries and increase their will to resist Communist aggression. Unilateral-US-action-in-using-Chinese Nationalist-troops-would-intensify-these-feelings. In addition if the other nations should determine that it is necessary to make a stand in Korea, they will be more amenable when they recognize this as a method of relieving them of the necessity of providing more forces themselves."

e. Reference par. 6. Amend as follows: "At a time of delicate negotiations the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would-remove whatever change-might-remain-of might have prejudiced an immediate political

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solution of the Korean conflict deriving from those negotiations.  
~~Although it is evident that Communist China strongly supports general~~  
~~Soviet strategic objectives, this support might become even stronger as~~  
~~a result of the use of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea. This would not~~  
~~necessarily have precluded, however, a later political settlement. It was,~~  
~~therefore, important that a decision to use Nationalist troops be deferred~~  
~~until the probabilities of obtaining an acceptable immediate political~~  
~~solution were gone. However, Chinese Communist intervention on a massive~~  
~~scale is already a fact, and an immediate political solution deriving~~  
~~from present negotiations now appears to have reached a point of diminishing~~  
~~returns.~~

f. Reference par. 7. Delete entire paragraph: ~~"The--USSR~~  
~~would probably welcome a unilateral .....reactionary regime."~~

C. P. CABELL  
 Maj General, USAF  
 Director of Intelligence

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